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Abstract—Market clearing in restructured power systems is
mostly implemented through an offer-based setting with the goal
of maximizing social welfare. This approach leads to sound results
from an economic viewpoint when generation offers reflect true
production costs. However, offers may significantly differ from
actual costs in practice, thus yielding undesired distortion. Under a
marginal pricing scheme, this paper presents a general bilevel pro-
gramming framework for alternative market-clearing procedures
dependent on market-clearing prices rather than on offers. The
resulting nonlinear mixed-integer bilevel programming formula-
tion is transformed into an equivalent single-level mixed-integer
linear program suitable for efficient off-the-shelf software. The
bilevel formulation is investigated through a particular instance
of price-based market clearing driven by consumer payment
minimization. This problem has recently received considerable
attention due to the open challenges posed from both modeling
and computational perspectives. Numerical results are provided
to illustrate the performance of the proposed approach.
Index Terms—Bilevel programming, consumer payment mini-








Index set of generating units.
Index set of time periods.
Feasibility set for scheduling variables .
Feasibility set for the dispatching variables
associated with unit in period .
Feasibility set for the scheduling variables
associated with unit in period .
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C. Functions
Objective function of the market-clearing
procedure.
Objective function of the economic dispatch.
Constrained functions associated with power
balance equations.
Constrained functions associated with the
inequalities representing the system operation.
Constrained functions associated with
revenues from selling energy.
Lagrangian function of the lower-level
problem.
Functions associated with the definition of
market-clearing prices.
D. Constants
Demand in period .
Minimum down time of unit .
Price of the th energy block offered by unit
in period .
No-load offer price of unit in period .
Start-up offer price of unit in period .
Upper bound for the power output of unit
in period .
Lower bound for the power output of unit
in period .
Ramp-down limit of unit .
Ramp-up limit of unit .
Number of periods unit has been offline
prior to the first period of the time span (end
of period 0).
Shut-down ramp limit of unit .
Start-up ramp limit of unit .
Minimum up time of unit .
E. Variables
Energy offer cost of unit in period .
Power output of unit in period .
Payment for the start-up of unit in period .
Binary variable that is equal to 1 if unit is
scheduled on in period , being 0 otherwise.
Market-clearing price in period .
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Lagrange multipliers associated with the
inequality constraints of the economic
dispatch.
Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints on the dispatching variables of unit
in period .
I. INTRODUCTION
I N the framework of the nowadays competitive power in-dustry, this paper considers a pool-based electricity market
for energy. The independent system operator (ISO) receives en-
ergy offers from producers and energy bids from consumers, and
determines, for every hour, the market-clearing price, the power
productions, and the consumption levels.
The market-clearing procedure used by the ISO is typically
formulated as a unit commitment problem [1]–[3] in which gen-
eration offers replace production costs and consumption bids
are taken into account. In this problem, the objective function
to be maximized is referred to as the declared social welfare.
When the demand is inelastic, the objective function only in-
cludes generation offer information and the resulting problem
becomes an offer cost minimization. Market-clearing prices re-
sulting from the unit commitment problem are used for market
settlement.
Under the assumption of perfect competition, the optimal
market-clearing solution is equal to the equilibrium solution
where the marginal value to consumers is equal to the marginal
cost to producers. This equilibrium maximizes the social wel-
fare, which is the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer
surplus. As a consequence, suppliers have no incentive to
offer different from their production costs. Thus, the declared
social welfare based on generation offers reflects the true social
welfare, and hence, maximizing social welfare is commonly
accepted as the right goal in a market setting [2], [3].
However, market-clearing procedures based on declared so-
cial welfare maximization are characterized by several practical
shortcomings [4], [5]. The assumption of perfect competition
does not hold in real-life power markets. Consequently, gener-
ation offers may not reflect actual costs and the optimization
might not maximize the true social welfare or accurately reflect
the natural behavior of market participants. This distortion may
be stressed by the presence of nonconvexities related to genera-
tion [1], [6] such as nonconvex energy offer curves, no-load of-
fers, ramping rates, minimum generation limits, and minimum
up and down times.
This paper analyzes an alternative type of market-clearing
procedure for energy trading in an electricity pool. The alter-
native market clearing explicitly incorporates market-clearing
prices in the problem formulation. This procedure is here-
inafter referred to as price-based market clearing. Examples
of price-based market clearing are 1) procedures based
on consumer payment minimization [5], [7]–[14], where
market-clearing prices appear in the objective function, and
2) revenue-constrained market-clearing procedures [7]–[10],
[12], where market-clearing prices appear in the constraints.
The day-ahead auction of the Spanish electricity market [15]
is a practical instance of price-based market clearing where
generator revenue constraints are considered. Moreover, new
procedures explicitly modeling generation and consumer sur-
plus maximization [16] would fall within this class of problems.
The presence of market-clearing prices in the problem for-
mulation complicates the solution of the optimization problem
since market-clearing prices may themselves result from an op-
timization process.
Several definitions for the market-clearing price are available
[2], being the two most commonly adopted 1) the price of the
highest accepted generation offer, which guarantees revenue ad-
equacy for suppliers, and 2) the marginal price, which provides
appropriate economic signals. While the former has received
considerable attention in price-based market clearing [5], [7],
[9]–[11], [13], few works have considered marginal pricing [8],
[12], [14], [16].
In [8], payment minimization under marginal pricing was
addressed by a heuristic approach. The proposed auction was
based on simple-part supply offers through which generators
were assumed to internalize their technical constraints. There-
fore, the resulting problem formulation only included a single
set of constraints ensuring revenue adequacy to generators.
Hao and Zhuang [12] presented a general formulation for
power auctions where marginal prices were used in a consumer
payment minimization context. The authors suggested taking
advantage of the two-layer structure of the problem formulation
but no specific solution algorithm was described.
Zhao et al. [14] were the first to formulate consumer payment
minimization under marginal pricing as a bilevel programming
problem in which the upper level minimizes consumer payment
whereas the lower level determines marginal market-clearing
prices. This important result permits the development of math-
ematical programming solutions to this complex problem. In
[14], augmented Lagrangian relaxation and surrogate optimiza-
tion were proposed, the solution of which might not satisfy fea-
sibility, as stated by the authors, thus requiring heuristic feasi-
bility repair procedures.
In [16], the authors described a new auction driven by con-
sumer and generation surplus maximization based on marginal
market-clearing prices. Agent-based simulation was used to
gain insight into the performance of the new auction model.
Within the framework of marginal pricing [17], the main
purpose of this paper is to formulate a general price-based
market-clearing procedure as a bilevel programming problem
[18], [19], of which the consumer payment minimization
reported in [14] is a particular instance. Bilevel programming
is appropriate to model problems where one agent, the leader,
optimizes its objective function (upper-level problem) consid-
ering that a second agent, the follower, will react by optimizing
its own objective function (lower-level problem). These models
are relevant in those situations where the actions of the follower
affect the decision making of the leader. This is the case in
price-based market clearing: the selection of accepted bids and
offers (upper-level problem) depends on market-clearing prices
(lower-level problem), which are in turn determined based on
the set of accepted bids and offers. Under marginal pricing,
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market-clearing prices are the Lagrange multipliers or dual
variables associated with the power balance equations in an
economic dispatch problem [17].
Unlike previous works [8], [12], [14], [16], the proposed
bilevel programming formulation takes into account intertem-
poral constraints such as ramping rates, minimum up and down
times, and time-dependent start-ups. Another salient feature of
this paper with respect to [14] is the proposal of an equivalent
single-level mixed-integer linear formulation based on the
application of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality con-
ditions and the use of well-known linearization schemes. The
main advantages of expressing the original bilevel optimization
as an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear program is
the guaranteed convergence to the optimal solution in a finite
number of steps [20] and the ready availability of efficient
commercial branch-and-cut software [21].
The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
1) The ISO is provided with an optimization-based general
framework for market clearing explicitly accounting for
marginal market-clearing prices in the problem formula-
tion.
2) Bilevel programming is proposed as a suitable solution
methodology.
3) The applicability of bilevel programming is illustrated with
the solution of an instance of price-based market clearing,
namely the consumer payment minimization problem.
It should be noted that the proposed approach may be useful
for the ISO to monitor market participants’ behavior under al-
ternative market designs and to examine the long-term implica-
tions of such trading schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides a general formulation for price-based
market clearing under marginal pricing. Section III presents
the solution methodology. Section IV describes the application
of the proposed framework to the consumer payment mini-
mization problem. In Section V, numerical results illustrate the
performance of the proposed approach. Relevant conclusions
are drawn in Section VI. Finally, the complete formulation for
the mixed-integer linear equivalent of the consumer payment
minimization problem is provided in the Appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The price-based market-clearing procedure can be formu-







where the vector of scheduling variables represents the on/off
statuses of generating units and the payments for generation
start-ups, whereas the vector of dispatching variables char-
acterizes energy offers and network-related variables.
The objective function (1) may comprise either the de-
clared social welfare, the consumer payment, or the sum of
the generation and consumer surplus. Expressions (2), exclu-
sively involving scheduling variables , include integrality
constraints, start-up payment constraints, and minimum up
and down times. Constraints (3) denote the equalities associ-
ated with power balance equations. Constraints (4) model all
inequalities involving variables and such as power limits
and ramping limits. Expressions (5) represent all inequality
constraints involving market-clearing prices such as those
imposing revenue adequacy. Finally, constraints (6) are the
definition of the vector of market-clearing prices.
Under marginal pricing, the vector of market-clearing prices
is defined as the vector of marginal costs [17]. Mathematically,
can be derived from the following economic dispatch problem




where the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (8)
and (9) are in parentheses.
It is worth mentioning that the objective function (7) may be
different from that of the price-based market-clearing procedure
(1). Moreover, the vector of market-clearing prices is equal to
the vector of Lagrange multipliers or dual variables associated
with the power balance equations (8).
As can be noted, the definition of the vector of market-
clearing prices under marginal pricing is an optimization
problem itself (7)–(9). Thus, the price-based market-clearing









The above bilevel problem consists of an upper-level opti-
mization (10)–(12) and a lower-level optimization (13)–(15).
The upper level controls the vector of scheduling variables
. Lower-level decision variables comprise the vector of dis-
patching variables whereas the vector of market-clearing
prices is an outcome of the lower-level problem.
The goal of the upper level is to minimize the price-based
market-clearing objective function (10) evaluated at the optimal
values of the lower-level variables, and , subject to expres-
sions exclusively constraining upper-level decision variables
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(11), to a set of constrained functions with and as parame-
ters (12), and to the lower-level optimization (13)–(15).
The lower-level optimization is identical to the economic dis-
patch problem (7)–(9) associated with the optimal values of the
upper-level decision variables .
In general, problem (10)–(15) is a mixed-integer nonlinear
bilevel programming problem. In practice, offers and bids con-
sist of a set of energy blocks with their corresponding prices,
thereby yielding piecewise linear functions. Offers and bids may
also be submitted as nonlinear curves, typically represented by
quadratic functions [22] that can be accurately approximated by
a set of tangent lines. This approximation yields piecewise linear
functions, which for practical purposes are indistinguishable
from the nonlinear models if enough segments are used [22].
Therefore, the lower-level objective function (13) is typically
piecewise linear. Analogously, constraints (14) and (15), in-
cluding power balance equations as well as generation and net-
work limits, are usually modeled as linear expressions. Hence,
the lower-level problem (13)–(15) is parameterized in terms of
the upper-level decision vector in such a way that the lower-
level problem is linear and thus convex. As described next, this
feature allows the transformation of problem (10)–(15) into an
equivalent single-level mixed-integer program.
III. SOLUTION APPROACH
To convert the original bilevel formulation (10)–(15) into an
equivalent single-level problem, the lower-level optimization is
first replaced by its KKT conditions.
Consider the Lagrangian function associated with the lower-
level problem (13)–(15) for a given upper-level vector :
(16)







where (17), (18) are the dual feasibility constraints, (19), (20)
are the primal feasibility constraints, and (21) expresses the
complementary slackness conditions.










Problem (22)–(29) falls into the category of what is known
in the literature as a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints [19], [23]. As can be seen, the vectors of Lagrange
multipliers and become decision variables of the resulting
single-level equivalent. In addition, the following types of non-
linearities may be present in problem (22)–(29):
1) Nonlinear offer and bid curves leading to nonlinear expres-
sions for the generation and consumer surplus in (22). As
mentioned above, these nonlinear expressions are replaced
by accurate piecewise linear approximations.
2) Bilinear products of market-clearing prices and power con-
sumptions typically involved in (22) when the demand is
elastic, and bilinear products of market-clearing prices and
power outputs in (24). These sets of nonlinear products can
be transformed into equivalent linear expressions based on
the KKT conditions as described in [24].
3) Products of scheduling variables , typically binary, and
continuous variables and in (25). These nonlinearities
can be equivalently formulated as linear expressions using
previously reported integer algebra results [25].
4) Products of Lagrange multipliers and lower-level decision
variables in the complementary slackness conditions
(29). As shown by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl [26], com-
plementary slackness conditions can also be formulated
as mixed-integer linear programming expressions. It is
worth mentioning that under the assumption of linearity
of the lower-level problem, complementary slackness
conditions (29) can be replaced by the equality associated
with the strong duality theorem [27], thereby leading to
a more effective linearization in terms of computational
performance [28].
Thus, after some algebra, problem (22)–(29) is recast as a
mixed-integer linear programming problem suitable for com-
mercially available branch-and-cut software [21].
IV. APPLICATION
To illustrate the above bilevel programming framework,
we now consider an instance of price-based market clearing,
namely the payment minimization problem, hereinafter referred
to as PM. The model is built on that presented in [13] with
the following extensions: 1) generation offers may consist of
several energy blocks and include a no-load term and a time-de-
pendent start-up term, which are both accounted for in the
payment function, 2) minimum up and down times are consid-
ered, and 3) ramping limits comprising ramp-up, ramp-down,
start-up, and shut-down ramp rates are modeled. As done in
[13], we assume that the demand is inelastic, and transmission
network and ancillary services are ignored. Notwithstanding,
these simplifications do not alter our main conclusion, and
results could be extended to include all of them at the expense
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The objective function (30) represents the total payment by
consumers and comprises three terms, respectively, related to
generation energy offers, start-up offers, and no-load offers.
Constraints (31) are the power balance equations. Expressions
(32) characterize generation constraints exclusively involving
scheduling variables, i.e., minimum up and down times as
well as start-up payments. Analogously, constraints (33) are
related to dispatching variables and model the block structure
of energy offers as well as power limits and ramping limits.
The interested reader is referred to [3] and [29] for a detailed
description of these linear constraints. Constraints (34) impose
the integrality of variables . Finally, constraints (35) model
the marginal pricing setting. For the sake of unit consistency,
hourly time periods are considered.
According to Section II, the bilevel programming formulation








The upper-level optimization (36)–(38) determines the gen-
erator on/off statuses and the corresponding start-up pay-
ments that minimize the consumer payment. In contrast,
the lower-level problem (39)–(41) determines the energy offer
costs , the power outputs , and the market-clearing prices
associated with the upper-level scheduling variables by
solving a multiperiod economic dispatch based on the mini-
mization of the overall generation energy offer cost. Note that
TABLE I
DATA FOR THE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
TABLE II
RESULTS FOR THE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
the lower-level problem (39)–(41) is a linear program parame-
terized in terms of . This parameterization is embedded in the
feasibility set .
As described in Section III, the use of the KKT optimality
conditions, duality theory, and integer algebra results allows
transforming the bilevel programming problem (36)–(41) into
an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear program. The
complete formulation of the resulting single-level equivalent is
provided in the Appendix.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Results from several case studies are presented in this sec-
tion. For didactical purposes, the bilevel programming frame-
work for PM has been first applied to an illustrative example
presented in [13]. The second case study is based on the IEEE
Reliability Test System (RTS) [30], [31], and includes intertem-
poral constraints and multiple-block generation offers. In order
to assess the practical applicability of the proposed framework,
the 25-unit system described in [13] has been replicated to ana-
lyze systems including up to 100 generating units. For all cases,
the results of PM are compared with those achieved by a conven-
tional market-clearing procedure based on the minimization of
the generation offer cost including energy, start-up, and no-load
offers [3]. This cost minimization problem is denoted as CM.
The model has been implemented on a Dell PowerEdge R910
X64 with four processors at 8 GHz and 32 GB of RAM using
CPLEX 12.1 [21] under GAMS [32].
A. Illustrative Example
The first test case was described in [13] and considers 2 h and
four generating units which are initially scheduled off. Genera-
tion offers comprise a single energy block and a single start-up
price, whereas no-load offers, minimum up and down times as
well as ramping limits are not modeled. Table I shows the data
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TABLE III
GENERATION DATA FOR THE RTS-BASED CASE
for both periods. This example is useful to highlight the differ-
ences in the results yielded by PM and CM.
For this illustrative example, the computing time required to
achieve the optimal solution to PM using the single-level equiv-
alent was less than 1 s.
The optimal solutions to CM and PM are summarized in
Table II. Under conventional market clearing, generators 1, 2,
and 3 are dispatched at maximum capacity in both periods,
whereas generator 4 is not scheduled. Generator 3 is the mar-
ginal unit in both periods thereby setting the corresponding
market-clearing prices equal to its energy offer price, i.e.,
$65/MWh. This solution costs $6050 and yields a payment
equal to $16 300.
In contrast, PM results in a different schedule in both periods.
While generators 1 and 2 do not experience any change in their
generation levels with respect to the solution to CM, genera-
tors 3 and 4 exchange their schedules and power dispatches. As
a consequence, generator 4 becomes the marginal unit in both
periods, setting both market-clearing prices at $30/MWh. The
optimal payment is equal to $9300 and the associated offer cost
is equal to $6400. In other words, a 42.9% reduction in payment
is attained at the expense of a 5.8% increase in offer cost.
In this case, the market-clearing price in each period under
marginal pricing is identical to the corresponding highest
accepted energy offer price. Note, however, that both pricing
schemes lead in general to different market-clearing prices
irrespective of the objective function being minimized. As an
example, let the demand at hour 1 be reduced so that it belongs
to the interval (50, 55] MW. At the optimal solution to either
CM or PM, generator 2 would be dispatched at its minimum
power output while generator 1 would be the marginal unit
by supplying the remaining demand. Under marginal pricing,
the market-clearing price would be the energy offer price of
generator 1, i.e., $10/MWh, whereas the highest accepted
energy offer price is that of generator 2, i.e., $20/MWh.
B. RTS-Based Case
The second case study considers 32 generating units and 24 h.
Table III lists the data for generators including power limits,
ramping rates, minimum up and down times, initial statuses,
and start-up and no-load offer prices. It is assumed that gener-
ating units submit piecewise linear energy offers consisting of
as many slopes as the number of incremental heat rate blocks
(see [31, Table IX]). The conversion rates from Btu to dol-
lars for each type of fuel are from [30], i.e., #6 oil $2.3/MBtu,
TABLE IV
SYSTEM DEMAND FOR THE RTS-BASED CASE
TABLE V
RESULTS FOR THE RTS-BASED CASE
#2 oil $3.0/MBtu, coal $1.2/MBtu, and nuclear $0.6/MBtu, re-
spectively. Moreover, it is also assumed that generators do not
modify their respective supply offers over the time span. The
hourly system demand is shown in Table IV and corresponds to
Wednesday of week 35 [31].
In a practical operational setting, proving optimality is less
important than improving the current solution within a specific
timeframe. Thus, based on current industry practice [33], the ex-
ecution of CPLEX was stopped when the value of the payment
was below a specified threshold or when this number appeared
to have reached a lower bound. In addition, a time limit of 1 h
was set. With these stopping criteria, Table V shows the results
attained by the proposed approach for PM. The computing time
required by this solution was 44.5 min. Table V also lists the
results corresponding to the optimal solution to CM, which was
attained in 13.3 s. Note that the payment associated with the op-
timal solution to CM represents a relevant upper bound for the
optimal objective function value of PM. As can be seen, a sub-
stantial 17.4% reduction in payment is achieved by increasing
the offer cost by 14.2%.
Moreover, the stopping criteria have been validated by ob-
serving the evolution of the objective function value versus com-
puting time when longer executions are implemented. Model
runs for PM within time limits of 3600 s, 10 000 s, and 50 000 s
were carried out, and total payments obtained were found to be
within 0.01% and 0.003% of each other, respectively, whereas
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Fig. 1. Market-clearing prices and system demand for the RTS-based case.
the system operation was similar for all simulations. Hence, the
stopping criteria adopted based on a 1-h timeframe were judged
to provide an adequate tradeoff between computing time and so-
lution accuracy.
Hourly market-clearing prices associated with the solution to
PM presented in Table V are depicted in Fig. 1. This figure also
shows the hourly system demand. Note that market-clearing
prices determined by PM follow the shape of the demand curve.
This is a reasonable result bearing in mind that market-clearing
prices are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the power
balance equations in the economic dispatch characterizing the
lower-level problem.
C. Real-Sized Case Studies
The proposed bilevel programming formulation has been ap-
plied to solve several real-sized case studies built on a base test
system comprising 25 generating units. A time span of 24 h is
considered. The data for the generating units and demand of
the base test system can be found in [13]. Three additional case
studies have been generated by replicating the base test system
and scaling the system demand accordingly.
Table VI lists the results obtained by PM with the aforemen-
tioned stopping criteria. The results associated with the optimal
solutions to CM are also provided in Table VI. As can be seen,
payments are reduced by factors ranging between 6.99% for
the 25-unit case and 7.28% for the 100-unit case with respect
to the corresponding upper bound provided by the optimal so-
lution to CM. These payment reductions incur slight cost in-
creases below 2.6% for all cases. It is worth mentioning that
the computing times required to attain such near-optimal solu-
tions are significantly lower than that required for the RTS-based
case. This is an indication of the case-dependent behavior of the
branch-and-cut algorithm. The quality of the solutions attained
by PM has been assessed by allowing longer execution times up
to 50 000 s. In all extended simulations, total payments found
by PM remained unchanged with respect to the values reported
in Table VI, thereby supporting the validity of the results.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has formulated the price-based market-clearing
problem under marginal pricing as a general bilevel program-
ming problem, offering flexibility in the problem definition. The
resulting bilevel programming formulation is transformed into
TABLE VI
RESULTS FOR THE REAL-SIZED TEST SYSTEMS
an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear program. This
transformation comprises two steps. First, the lower-level opti-
mization is replaced by a set of constraints based on the KKT
optimality conditions. Subsequently, a number of nonlinearities
are converted to linear equivalents using some well-known lin-
earization schemes.
The ultimate goal of this paper is to provide the ISO with
a tool that can be used for comparative analysis of different
market-clearing procedures, so that informed decisions can be
made.
This general bilevel formulation and its single-level equiv-
alent have been applied to an instance of price-based market
clearing in which consumer payment is minimized. Numerical
results reveal that bilevel programming is an effective approach
to address price-based market-clearing procedures.
We are currently investigating new formulations of the single-
level equivalent model with the goal of reducing the computa-
tion time required to prove optimality. Moreover, research is un-
derway to solve other instances of price-based market clearing
such as those explicitly maximizing the surplus of consumers
and producers, as well as market-clearing procedures with rev-
enue adequacy constraints. Another interesting avenue of re-
search is to analyze the long-term effects of price-based market
clearing and to monitor the behavior of market agents under al-
ternative market designs. Finally, further research will also be
devoted to the analysis of joint energy and reserve electricity
markets.
APPENDIX
The single-level equivalent of the consumer payment mini-
mization problem presented in Section IV can be formulated as
the following mixed-integer linear program:
(42)
(43)





































The above formulation is based on those presented in [3] and
[29]. Parameter represents the upper bound for the power
produced from the th energy block offered by unit in pe-
riod . The number of energy blocks offered by unit is de-
noted by . Similarly, is the number of time periods. It
should also be noted that the vector of Lagrange multipliers
associated with constraints (41) is made up of , asso-
ciated with the upper bound for the power produced in each
energy block; , associated with the definition of as the
sum of the power produced in each energy block; , related
to the shut-down ramping rate constraints; , associated with
the upper bound for the power output; , associated with the
ramp-up and start-up ramp rate constraints; and , related to
the ramp-down constraints. Symbols and are the respec-
tive upper bounds for and . Analogously, , , ,
and are the lower bounds for , , , and , respec-
tively. As described in [24], these bounding parameters may
be selected based on the values of the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers resulting from the optimal solution to the associated
offer cost minimization problem.
The objective function (42) and constraints (43), (44) cor-
respond to the upper-level optimization (36)–(38) whereas
(45)–(79) equivalently replace the lower-level optimization
problem (39)–(41). Constraints (45), (46) are the primal fea-
sibility constraints, (47)–(54) represent the dual feasibility
constraints, (55) expresses the linear equality associated with
the strong duality theorem, which represents complementary
slackness conditions, and (56)–(79) model the linearization
of the products of binary and continuous variables resulting
from the transformation to a single-level equivalent. These
linear terms require the introduction of additional continuous
variables , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , and .
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